State of Utah v. Thomas Wyman Berg : Brief of Amicus Curiae by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1980
State of Utah v. Thomas Wyman Berg : Brief of
Amicus Curiae
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Robert Van Sciver; Edward K. Brass; G. Fred Metos; Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant;
Robert B. Hansen; Attorney for Respondent;
F. John Hill; Bruce C. Lubeck; G. Fred Metos; Attorneys for Amicus Curiae;
This Brief of Amicus Curiae is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah
Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Amicus Curiae, State v. Berg, No. 16548 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1823
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF U~ 
STATE OF UTAH, BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
THOMAS WYMAN BERG, Case No. 16548 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction in 
the Fourth Judicial Distri~t Court in and for Utah County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable George E. Ballif, Judge presiding. 
ROBERT HANSEN 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
F. JOHN HILL 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
G. FRED METOS 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 
~-v-I TI!OMAS WYMAN BERG ' 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
l 
Case No. 16548 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction in 
the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable George E. Ball if, Judge presiding. 
ROBERT HANSEN 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
F. JOHN HILL 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
G. FRED METOS 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTEHTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOHER COURT. 
~LIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS. 
ARGUMENT 
THE APPLICATION OF THE AHENDED VERSION OF THE 
ACC011PLICE CORROBORATION STATUTE ALLOHED THE 
APPELLANT TO BE CO~~ICTED ON THE BASIS OF LESS 
EVIDENCE THAN THE LAW REQUIRED AT THE TIME OF 
THE COHHISSION OF THE OFFENSE, THUS VIOLATING 






OF BOTH UTAH AND THE UNITED STATES . 3 
CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . 
CASES CITED 
Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 216 (1925) . 
Calder v. Bull, 3 Call 386 (1798) 
Coomings v. Hississippi, 162 U.S. 588 (1895). 
Coomings v. Hissouri, 4 Wall 277 (1866) 
Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977) 
Ex parte Hedley, 134 U.S. 160 (1889). . 
Government of Virgin Islands v. Civil, 591 F.2d 255 (3d 
Cir. 1979) . . . . . . . . . · 
Hart v. State, 40 Ala. 32 (1866). 
Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1883) 













Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
(Continued) 
Lindsey v. \Vashington, 301 U.S. 397 (1936) .. 
Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180 (1914). 
Plachey v. State, 239 S.W. 979 (Tex. 1922) 
State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285 (1941). 
State v. Lay, 38 Utah 143, 110 P. 986 (1910) .. 
State v. Somers, 97 Utah 132, 90 P.2d 273 (1939) 









United States v. Henson, 159 U.S. App. D.C. 32, 46, 486 
F.2d 1292, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1973). . . . . . . . 13 
STATE STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(l)A(c) (1953). 
Utah Code Ann. §77-31-17 (1953 as amended) 
Utah Code Ann. §77-31-18 (1953 as amended) 
Utah Code Ann. §77-31-18 (1979 amended version). 
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED 
United States Constitution, Article I, Section 10. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 18 










Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
lliOMAS WYMAN BERG, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 
Case No. 16548 
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant appeals from his conviction by the Honorable 
George E. Ballif, Fourth District Judge, sitting without jury, of 
the offense of Distribution of a Controlled Substance where nothing 
for value was exchanged. He further appeals from the Court's 
failure to find that the State's principal witness against him 
!'as his accomplice and from the Court's failure to require cor-
roboration of the accomplice's testimony. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was found guilty on May 25, 1979, by the 
Honorable George E. Ballif of a violation of Utah Code Ann. 
!58-37-S(l)A(c) (1953), distributing a controlled substance, 
marijuana, where nothing for value was exchanged. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of judgment of guilt 
rendered against him and a new trial in the above entitled 
matter. Amicus Curiae seeks a ruling from this Court that 
Utah Code Ann. §77-31-18 (1979 amended version) cannot be 
applied retroactively. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The primary witness against the appellant was one 
Jill Hales who testified that she had received marijuana 
from the appellant on November 21, 1978 (T. 16) and sold it 
to an undercover agent, Craig Wiseman (T. 18). She was 
subsequently arrested and after being threatened with prison 
and the loss of her child, she agreed to accept a grant of 
immunity in exchange for her testimony against the appellant 
(T. 30). The case was tried on May 24, 1979, and the trial 
court ruled that the accomplice corroboration statute, 
Utah Code Ann. §77-31-18 (1979 amended version) which had 
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ARGUMENT 
THE APPLICATION OF THE AMENDED VERSION OF THE 
ACCOMPLICE CORROBORATION STATUTE ALLOWED THE 
APPELLANT TO BE CONVICTED ON THE BASIS OF LESS 
EVIDENCE THAN THE LAW REQUIRED AT THE TIME OF 
THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE, THUS VIOLATING 
THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTIONS 
OF BOTH UTAH AND THE UNITED STATES. 
The appellant was convicted of the offense of Distri-
bution of a Controlled Substance where nothing of value is ex-
changed, which was alleged to have occurred on or about November 
21, 1978. At that time, Utah law required that a defendant could 
not be convicted on the testimony of an accomplice. Utah Code 
Ann. §77-31-18 (1953 as amended) provided: 
Conviction on testimony of accomplice.-A 
conviction shall not be had on the testimony 
of an accomplice, unless he is corroborated 
by other evidence, which in itself and without 
the aid of the testimony of the accomplice 
tends to connect the defendant with the com-
mission of the offense; and the corroboration 
shall not be sufficient, if it merely shows 
the commission of the offense or the circum-
stances thereof. 
The 1979 Utah Legislature amended that statute to eliminate this 
corroboration requirement. The amended version of that statute 
became effective on May 8, 1979. Utah Code Ann. §77-31-18 now 
provides: 
Conviction on uncorroborated testimon of 
accomplice- Cautionary instruction.- 1 A 
conviction may be had on the uncorroborated 
testimony of an accomplice. 
(2) In the discretion of the court, an 
instruction to the jury may be given to the 
- 3 -
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effect that such uncorroborated testimony 
should be viewed with caution, and such an 
instruction should be given if the trial 
judge finds the testimony of the accomplice 
to be self contradictory, uncertain, or 
improbable. 
Testimony of an accomplice must be corroborated as 
required by the provision of Utah Code Ann. §77-31-17 (1953 as 
amended) which was in effect at the time that the offense which 
is presently before the Court was alleged to have been committed. 
Any application of the 1979 amendement of Utah Code Ann. §77-31-18 
(1979 amended version) would constitute an ex post facto applica-
tion of the present statute and would be prohibited by both the 
Utah and United States Constitutions. This is because the 1979 
amended version of the statute requires the State to produce less 
evidence to obtain a conviction than was necessary at the time 
that the offense allegedly occurred. 
The Constitutions of the United States and the State 
of Utah both expressly prohibit any ex post facto law. Article 
I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution provides: 
No state shall ... pass any bill of attainer, 
ex post facto law, or law impairing the obli-
gation of contracts. 
Article I, Section 18 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
No bill of attainer, ex post facto law, or 
law impairing the obligation of contracts 
shall be passed. 
The above provisions are commonally referred to as the ex post 
facto clauses, and was first given judicial interpretation in 
- 4 -
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calder v. Bull, 3 Call, 386 (1798). In that case, the United 
States Supreme Court was faced with a question of the retroactive 
application of a change in probate laws by a state legislature. 
The Court first noted that the purpose for the enactment of the 
ex post facto clause, like other constitutional provisions, was 
to prevent abuses that had occurred in Great Britain prior to the 
revolution. The type of abuses that the ex post facto clause is 
aimed at includes acts that w·ere made criminal by the legislature 
after the acts had occurred. Two important factors in the appli-
cation of the ex post facto clause derive from this policy: 
First, the clause applies primarily to 
criminal actions; 
Secondly, the nature of retroactive applica-
tion applies to the time that the offense 
vras alleged to have been committed. 
The Court in an often-quoted passage described four situations 
that it considered to be exemplary of ex post facto laws: 
I will state what laws I consider ex post 
facto within the words and intention of the 
prohibition. 1st, every law that makes an 
action done before the passing of the law; 
and which was innocent when done, criminal; 
and punishes such action. 2d, every law that 
advocates a crime, or makes it greater than 
it was when committed. 3d, every law that 
changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater 
punishment, than the law annexed to the crime 
when committed. 4th, every law that alters 
the legal rules of evidence and receives 
less or different testimony, than the law 
required at the time of the commission of the 
offense in order to convict the offender. 
All these and similar laws, are manifestly 
injust and oppressive. 
3 Dall. 386, 390-391. 
- 5 -
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Although the Court did not find the ex post facto clause 
to be applicable in Calder v. Bull, supra, in Cummings v. Missouri, 
4 Wall 277 (1866), the Court applied the criteria set forth in 
Calder v. Bull, supra, and found the statute in question there 
to be an ex post facto law because it retroactively made past 
acts criminal. The statute in Cummings v. Missouri, supra, re-
quired people to take an oath stating that they had always been 
loyal to the United States. The statute was enacted at a time 
immediately following the Civil Har, thus making the acts of those 
ioyal to the con-federacy criminal. 
Later, in Kring v. Missouri, 17 Otto 221 (1882), the 
Court struck down a death sentence resulting from a change in 
Missouri law. This change allowed the State to refile a higher 
degree of an offense after a defendant's conviction for a lower 
offense was reversed on appeal. The Court noted that the change in 
the lav1 meant the difference between life and death for the 
defendant. The State had argued that the change in the law occur-
red prior to the defendant's plea to second degree murder and 
secondly, that the change was merely procedural and consequently 
vras not affected by the ex post facto clause. The Court rejected 
both of these contentions. It noted that the ex post facto clause 
applied to the time at which the offense charged \vas corrrrnitted 
stating, "This term necessarily implies a fact or act done after 
\Vhich the law in question is passed." 17 Otto 221, 225. The 
Court also rejected the State's argument that the change in the 
- 6 -
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law was merely procedural. It first noted that procedural matters 
involve pleading, evidence or practice which are not the subjects 
of the ex post facto clause. However, when a change in the law 
denies a defendant of a defense that he had at the time that the 
offense was committed or when the change affects any substantial 
right to his serious disadvantage, the ex post facto clause 
~plies. 
The distinction between substantive and procedural 
changes in the law, since that time, has been the dominate ques-
tion in cases involving the ex post facto clause. The Court's 
decisions in this question provide some guidance in making this 
distinction. A reduction in the size of the jury in a felony 
prosecution was held to be a substantive change in the law. 
Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1897). But a change in the law 
that placed higher qualifications on jurors was regarded as pro-
cedural. Cummings v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 588 (1895). Substan-
tive changes with respect to punishment generally involve a change 
in the nature of the punishment rather than the means of imposing 
it. A retroactive change in the law requiring a mandatory rather 
than a discretionary sentence, Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 
397 (1936), or requiring solitary confinement rather than simple 
incarceration, Ex parte Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1889), have been 
held to be subject to the restrictions of the ex post facto clause. 
However, a retroactive change in the means of imposing a specific 
sentence, such as electrocution rather than hanging for a death 
- 7 -
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sentence, Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180 (1914), or 
requiring the State to present more evidence and follow more 
stringent court procedures before imposing the death penalty, 
Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977), were not prohibited 
by the ex post facto clause. 
The final type of distinction that has been made deals 
with the amount of evidence required to prove an offense. In 
Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1883), the rules of evidence were 
changed to allow a person who had previously been convicted of 
a felony to testify. The Court noted that this change merely 
expanded the class of persons allowed to testify, it did not de-
prive the defendant of a substantial right which he possessed at 
the time that the offense was committed. In upholding this 
retroactive change in the rules of evidence, the Court did not 
allow all such rules to be changed then applied in a retroactive 
manner. In making this distinction, the Court stated: 
The crime for >vhich the present defendant 
was indicted, the punishment prescribed 
therefor, and the quantity or the degree 
of proof necessary to establish his guilt, 
all remained unaffected by the subsequent 
statute. Any statutory alteration of the 
legal rules of evidence which would authorize 
conviction upon less proof, in amount or 
degree than was required when the offense 
was committed, might, in respect of that 
offense, be obnoxious to the constitutional 
inhibition upon ex post facto laws. But 
alterations which do not increase the 
punishment nor change the ingredients of 
the offense or the ultimate facts necessary 
to establish guilt, but leaving untouched 
the nature of the crime and the amount or 
- 8 -
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degree of proof essential to conviction 
only removes existing restrictions upon' 
the competency of certain classes of persons 
as witnesses, relate to modes of procedure 
only, in which no one can be said to have 
a vested right, and which the State, upon 
grounds of public policy, may regulate at 
pleasure. Such regulations of the mode 
in which the facts constituting guilt may 
be placed before the jury, can be made 
applicable to prosecutions or trials 
thereafter had, without reference to the 
date of the commission of the offense charged. 
110 u.s. 574, 594. 
In Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 216 (1925), the Court held that a 
statutory change in the rules of joinder and severance operate to 
change only the mode of the trial and the Court analogized this to 
the situation where the rules of evidence have been changed. But 
with respect to changes in the rules of evidence, the Court stated 
that where the change in the law is with respect to the quantum 
and kind of proof encessary to establish guilt, then it is subject 
to the ex post facto clause. This is exactly the situation before 
this Court in the case at bar with respect to the change in the 
accomplice corroboration statute, Utah Code Ann. §77-31-18 (1953 
as amended) . 
Prior to May of 1979, the accomplice corroboration statute, 
Utah Code Ann. §77-31-18 (1953 as amended) provided: 
Conviction on testimony of accomplice.-A 
conviction shall not be had on the testimony 
of an accomplice, unless he is corroborated 
by other evidence, which in itself and with-
out the aid of the testimony of the accomplice 
tends to connect the defendant >vith the com-
mission of the offense; and the corroboration 
shall not be sufficient, if it merely shows 
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The Legislature in 1979 amended this statute and the law in effect 
in the State of Utah after May of 1979, provides: 
Conviction on uncorroborated testimon of 
accomplice- Cautionary instruction.- 1 A 
conviction may be ha~on the uncorroborated 
testimony of an accomplice. 
(2) In the discretion of the court, an 
instruction to the jury may be given to the 
effect that such uncorroborated testimony 
should be viewed with caution, and such 
an instruction should be given if the trial 
judge finds the testimony of the accomplice 
to be self contradictory, uncertain, or 
improbable. 
As can easily be seen, the substantial difference between the two 
statutes is that previously a person could not be convicted upon 
the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, but now a person 
may be convicted on uncorroborated accomplice testimony. This 
means that under the statute in effect at the time that the State 
alleged that the offense which is the subject of this prosecution 
was committed more evidence was required to be produced than is 
now required to obtain a conviction. This is exemplified in the 
case law interpreting Utah Code Ann. §77-31-18 (1953 as amended). 
In State v. Lay, 38 Utah 143, 110 P. 986 (1910), the Court stated 
with respect to the accomplice corroboration statute: 
Under the statute, the jury has no legal right 
convict a defendant upon the uncorroborated 
testimony of an accomplice, even though they 
believe the testimony of the accomplice to 
be true as to every material fact, and are 
convinced by it of the guilt of the defendant 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
110 P.986, 987-988. 
- 10 -
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This Court went on to note that the corroborative evidence must 
' tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense, 
be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence and do 
rore than cast a grave suspicion on the accused. 
Likewise, in State v. Somers, 97 Utah 132, 90 P.2d 273 
(1939), the Court cited the accomplice corroboration statute and 
ilien stated: 
Under the above section a conviction can-
not be based on the testimony of an accom-
plice alone. There must be corroboration 
of his testimony. And the corroboration 
must be as to some material matter or fact 
which is inconsistent with defendant's 
innocence. And while it has been held that 
this corroborative evidence may be slight 
and may be established by circumstantial 
rather than direct evidence yet the evidence 
must do more than create a mere suspicion 
as to defendant's guilt. It must tend to 
connect defendant with the commission of 
the offense. And it is not sufficient 
corroboration to establish a motive merely. 
[Citations omitted] 90 P.2d 273. 
In that case, the Court also stated that if the State fails to 
present any evidence to corroborate the testimony of the accomplice 
then the trial court must dismiss the offense. If the State is 
able to present substantial evidence to corroborate the accomplice's 
testimony, the jury is to be instructed on the corroboration require-
ment and the weight of the corroborative evidence will be left to 
the jury. State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285 (1941). 
It is clear from the case law that the State could not 
obtain a conviction based solely on the testimony of accomplices. 
- 11 -
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Some additional evidence must be presented to prevent the case 
from being dismissed. Consequently, the amended version of Utah 
Code Ann. §77-31-18 (1979 amended version) is barred from retro-
active application by the ex post facto clause, because to apply 
it retroactively would allow the State to obtain a convcition on 
less, or different evidence than was required at the time of the 
alleged commission of the offense, Calder v. Bull, supra. 
Cases from other jurisdictions have reached the same 
conclusions with respect to similar changes in the law and the 
attempted retroactive application of those changes. In Government 
of Virgin Islands v. Civil, 591 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1979), the 
Court held that the repeal of the accomplice corroboration require-
ment which was the same as that previously in effect in Utah, could 
not be applied retroactively without violating the ex post facto 
clause. The statute in question there provided: 
No conviction can be had upon the testimony 
of an accomplice unless it be corroborated 
by such other evidence as tends to connect 
the defendant with the commission of the 
crime. The corroboration is not sufficient 
if it merely shows the commission of the 
crime or the circumstances of the commission. 
Virgin Islands Code Title 14, §17. 
The statute had been repealed between the time of trial and argu-
ment on appeal. One of the issues raised on appeal was whether a 
conspirator was an accomplice within the meaning of the corrobora-
tion statute. Before this issue could be reached, the retroactive 
effect of the repealing of the statute had to be determined. The 
- 12 -
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Court held that such an action by the Legislature could have no 
retroactive effect as it would violate the prohibition on applying 
changes in the law in an ex post facto manner. In doing so, the 
Court stated: 
Here the repeal of the corroboration statute 
reduces the amount of proof necessary for 
conviction. Unlike the permissible change 
in Hopt v. Utah, supra, the statute's 
repeal would "alter the degree, or lessen 
the amount or measure, of the proof which 
was made necessary to conviction when the 
crime was committed." Id. at 589, 4 S.Ct. 
at 210. Since it would-aeprive the accused 
of a substantial right that the law gave 
them at the time of the robbery, Kring.v. 
Hissouri, supra, 107 U.S. at 232.2 S.Ct. 
443, the repeal as applied to the case sub 
judice falls within the classes of changes 
prohibited by the ex post facto clause. 
See United States v. Henson, 159 U.S. 
App. D.C. 32, 46, 486 F.2d 1292, 1306 
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (en bane). Accordingly, 
these cases must be decided as if §17 were 
still in effect. [Footnote omitted) 
591 F.2d 255, 259. 
Likewise, in Hart v. State, 40 Ala. 32 (1866), the accomplice 
corroboration statute had been repealed benveen the time the 
offense had occurred and the time of trial. The trial court had 
refused to require corroboration and on appeal the Supreme Court 
of Alabama held that the trial court's action violated the ex 
post facto clause because the change in the law " ... altered 
a legal rule of evidence, and received less testimony than the 
law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in 
order to convict the offender." 40 Ala. 32, 35. 
- 13 -
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A somewhat similar problem was described in Plachey v. 
State, 239 S.W. 979 (Tex. 1922). That case involved a situation 
where the Texas Legislature changed the liquor sales statute so 
that the buyer of illegally sold liquor would not be an accomplice. 
Since Texas had an accomplice corroboration statute similar to the 
former Utah statute, illegal sellers of liquor were then subject 
to convictions based solely upon the testimony of the buyers. The 
retroactive change in the law in that case occurred between the 
time of the sale and the trial,and the trial court refused to 
instruct the jury on the requirement for corroboration of an 
accomplice's testimony. The appellate court held that such a rulin£ 
by the trial court violated the ex post facto clause because it 
allowed for a conviction to be had on less evidence at the time of 
trial than the State was required to produce at the time of the 
offense. 
At the time that the offense, which is subject of this 
prosecution, was alleged to have occurred, a person could not have 
been convicted solely on the testimony of an accomplice. The 
recent change in the law eliminated that requirement, thus 
making a conviction possible on the basis of less evidence than 
was previously required. To apply this change in the law to the 
appellant in the case in question here would relieve the State of 
a substantial part of its burden of proof that had to be met at 
the time that this offense was alleged to have been committed. 
Consequently, to apply the change in the accomplice corroboration 
- 14 -
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statute in a retroactive manner would violate the appellant's 
rights under the ex post facto clauses of both the United States 
and Utah Constitutions. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant in this case cannot be convicted on the 
uncorroborated testimony of accom;lices. To do otherwise- to 
proceed pursuant to the 1979 amended version of Utah Code Ann. 
!77-31-18 (1979 amended version) - would constitute a violation 
of the ex post facto clauses of both the United States Constitu-
tion and the Constitution of the State of Utah 
DATED this day of December, 1979. 
Respectfully submitted, 
F. JOHN HILL 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
G. FRED METOS 
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 
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